Meaningful Progress or Illusory Reform? Analyzing China's Labor Contract Law by Chan, Jenny
Chinese police break up a simulated riot during a drill in Changchun,  
in China’s Northeast Jilin Province, July 20, 2006.
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meaninGfUl 
proGreSS or 
illUSorY reform?
Analyzing China’s Labor 
Contract Law 
On June 29, 2007, at the meeting of the 28th session of the 10th National People’s 
Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, 145 attending party members voted unanimously 
in favor of the Labor Contract Law. Back in March 2006, when the government posted 
an initial draft of the law for comment on the Internet, officials received more than 
190,000 responses from the concerned public in one month. The NPC Legal Affairs 
Commission moved to finalize the legislation following tragic reports of slave labor 
conditions in the brick kilns of the Shanxi Province . . . Over these three decades, one of 
the most unsettling problems in our country is the blatant abuse of workers’ rights . . . 
Labor contracts in written form, if provided at all, have been predominantly short-term. 
Now, with the passage of the law, we’re able to better regulate the rights and obligations 
of both parties. We’ll also strengthen the monitoring role of local labor officials. The 
persons-in-charge who abuse their authority or neglect their responsibilities, thus 
resulting in serious harm to the interests of workers, will face administrative penalties or 
criminal prosecution. 
The NPC Standing Committee    
China Central Television (CCTV)1 
china’s labor conTracT law (lcl), which went into effect on January 1, 2008, represents a major compromise between 
the competing demands of many stakeholders 
both at home and abroad.2 Legal scholars agree 
that the law is the most significant piece of 
Chinese labor law reform in more than a decade.3 
Important provisions regarding: mandatory 
labor contracts for new employees; strengthening 
worker representatives’ and workplace-based 
trade unions’ roles in representing their work-
ers’ interests; worker entitlement to severance 
pay upon the expiration or termination of 
contracts under certain conditions; the regula-
tion of contingent labor; and the imposition of 
disciplinary measures on officials who neglect 
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their responsibilities or abuse their author-
ity. However, workers’ fundamental right to 
strike—the clause removed from China’s 1982 
Constitution—remains absent under the new 
law. Many of Chinese workers’ legal rights have 
been expanded, but many are still restricted, 
under the post-Mao authoritarian state.
What are the sociopolitical impacts of the 
Chinese Labor Contract Law, and what are its 
implications for industrial labor relations? The 
central government attempts to enhance its 
regime legitimization by emphasizing workers’ 
legal rights in the context of worsening labor 
conditions. The new law, at least on paper, is 
being hailed as a victory for Chinese workers’ 
struggle for dignity. Aggrieved workers and 
labor activists have invoked their legal rights 
to stage protests and anti-sweatshop campaigns 
to achieve economic and social justice. Despite 
the limited practical effects that labor laws and 
regulations have had on the actual protection 
of workers in 2008, legal reform in China is 
gradually changing for the better.
exploSive laBor proTeSTS 
and Social UnreST 
the chinese governmenT is perennially concerned about growing social insta-bility and political upheaval. Since the 
1990s, the frequency and scale of popular unrest 
has increased rapidly throughout the country. 
The Ministry of Public Security reported 8,700 
demonstrations and protests in 1993, increasing 
dramatically to 32,000 in 1999.4 That number 
surged to 58,000 in 2003, involving more than 
three million disgruntled workers, peasants, 
property owners, teachers, and students.5 In 
2004, the nationwide data of mass protests 
recorded 74,000,6 and 2005 saw an unprecedent-
ed high level of 87,000 protests; among them, 
violent confrontations or attacks on government 
property have grown at the 
fastest rate.7 In 2006, disputes 
accepted by labor arbitration 
committees reached 317,162, 
involving 679,312 labor-
ers nationwide.8 Still, there 
are many instances of labor 
conflict that are rejected from 
labor administrative or judicial 
systems. Far more aggrieved 
workers have taken to the streets to protest, 
as enterprise restructuring and privatization 
has increased. Unofficially, at least one strike 
involving more than 1,000 workers occurs every 
day in the manufacturing hub of the Pearl River 
Delta region, to say nothing of the many smaller 
spontaneous strikes.9
Worker rights violations have drawn gov-
ernmental attention. According to a large-scale, 
40-city survey conducted by the Ministry of 
Labor, only 12.5 percent of migrant workers 
have signed a labor contract.10 The country’s 130 
million migrant workers are mostly employed in 
the burgeoning private sector. Twenty percent 
or fewer of the workers in small- and medium-
sized private sector companies have signed labor 
contracts.11 This enables their employers to 
cut costs and evade paying benefit premiums. 
At private and failing state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), wages and benefits, such as pensions, 
medical coverage, and workers’ compensa-
tion are often underpaid or not paid at all. In 
Shenzhen, the Labor and Social Security Bureau 
has blacklisted 30 companies that owe at least 
12,070,238.9 yuan in back pay to their workers 
from June to September 2008.12 In terms of 
work hours, a survey by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) showed that migrant workers 
The 2008 Labor Contract Law 
is the most significant piece of 
Chinese labor law reform in 
more than a decade. 
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unduly subject to its constraints.”15 In effect, 
legal reform has substantially imbued the market 
economy with socialist characteristics, while 
failing to constrain the government’s exercise 
of power. 
At the local 
level, officials 
bend the rules 
and regulations 
primarily to 
serve their own economic and political interests. 
Under fiscal and administrative decentraliza-
tion policies, local states are driven to retain 
revenues and accumulate resources rather than 
to implement labor laws and regulations. Intense 
competition among localities to lure foreign 
investment has resulted in “flexible” enforce-
ment of labor laws. There is a deep-seated insti-
tutional conflict between legalistic legitimation 
and local accumulation, rendering workers’ legal 
rights unprotected.16
Local labor bureaus and trade unions fail to 
perform their mandatory monitoring duties. A 
labor official from Guangdong has stated, “Our 
job is to educate employers 
on the Labor Law, not punish 
them.”17 Similarly, a municipal 
trade union official has said:
I tell [foreign investors 
that] our union is, after 
all, under the leadership 
of the Communist Party . . . The 
Party invites you to invest in our 
country, you need to make profits, 
[and] our union’s work is to 
protect your stability [and] help 
you make profits, [not to let] 
workers make trouble for you. If 
you don’t let us set up [unions], 
when [workers] make trouble, 
there won’t be anyone to resolve 
these matters for you.18
routinely work 11 hours a day, six to seven days 
a week, far exceeding a normal five-day, 40-hour 
week.13 Forced overtime work, although illegal, 
is the norm.   
inSTiTUTional 
conTradicTionS of The 
chineSe leGal SYSTem
in response To increasingly conTenTious labor and sociopolitical relations, the state has taken greater lengths to promote the 
“socialist rule of law.” The central government 
has enacted or amended over 400 national laws, 
1,000 administrative acts, 10,000 local rules 
and regulations, and 30,000 administrative 
procedures over the course of the past 30 years 
of market reform.14 This relatively fast pace of 
Chinese legislative reform is something of a 
“legal revolution.” 
The Chinese government and Communist 
Party, however, adopt an instrumental view 
of the law, using it as a tool of control over 
society, while allowing the state to remain largely 
unsubordinated to it. Legal scholar William 
Alford insightfully analyzes the subtle limita-
tions of China’s post-Cultural Revolution legal 
construction measures: the Chinese authorities 
“wish to reap the advantages of liberal legality” 
with regard to “its perceived capacity to support 
economic growth, engage the international 
community, and legitimate the existing regime;” 
concurrently, they “aspire to do so without being 
Only 12.5 percent of Chinese migrant 
workers have signed a labor contract.
Local labor bureaus and trade 
unions fail to perform their 
mandatory monitoring duties. 
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had secured signed contracts, 33.4 percent 
revealed that they were either forced to sign 
“blank or incomplete contracts”—contracts 
failing to specify the employer or the job title, 
wage and benefits information, working hours, 
and the terms for the contract’s modification, 
renewal, or termination. One of the most outra-
geous cases was at a foreign-invested toy factory, 
where the company’s 100 workers were asked 
to sign contracts that were written in English, 
a language they could not read!   
In early 2008, Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) 
negotiated with Hong Kong-owned Hung Hing 
Printing Group about its unlawful practices 
targeting veteran workers. The 10,000-worker 
Hung Hing Printing (Shenzhen) factory was 
allegedly exploiting young migrant workers 
who made Disney-branded children’s books 
in the summer of 2005.23 After negative media 
exposure, the factory management had replaced 
dangerous machinery to improve occupational 
safety and health. On January 28, 2008, when 
the new labor law had taken effect, Hung Hing 
issued a company notice: 
Hung Hing is going to renew its 
contracts with all workers on or 
before January 30, 2008. A three-
year fixed-term contract between 
February 14, 2008 and December 
31, 2010 shall be concluded, or 
labor contracts terminated.24 
The 400-plus workers who had been work-
ing in Hung Hing for more than 10 consecutive 
Local states and enterprises tend to collude 
with each other to maximize economic gains at 
the expense of workers’ legitimate rights.
Lower courts are subject to the funding 
and hiring decisions of local governments, in 
spite of recent judicial reforms. Local judges 
lack autonomy and independence to uphold the 
law, especially in cases where outcomes are con-
tradictory to powerful interests. Despite the fact 
that the lower courts are increasingly reaching 
out to other courts of equal rank 
for guidance in making difficult 
legal decisions—an impressive 
development of “horizontal 
networking” between the courts 
in fostering legal innovations—
extensive external interference 
from higher courts and party 
officials persists.19 Under these 
circumstances, workers’ rights 
often end at the courtroom door.
Notwithstanding decades of legislative 
reform, huge discrepancies continue to exist 
between workers’ legal rights and the enforce-
ment of these rights. As more workers are 
disillusioned and disappointed by the ineffective 
and corrupt legal system, the state’s legitimacy 
is effectively undermined. 
Weak enforcemenT of The 
laBor conTracT laW 
JournalisTic accounTs conTend ThaT The new labor laws are already having a positive impact,20 but a number of Hong Kong 
and Chinese non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have suggested otherwise. There are 
severe rights violations in at least three major 
areas: job security; the use of contingent labor; 
and fair, fixed-term labor contracts. 
The Dagongzhe Centre,21 through snowball 
sampling, surveyed 320 migrant workers22 about 
their working conditions in Shenzhen four 
months after the Labor Contract Law’s imple-
mentation. While a majority of the respondents 
Huge discrepancies continue 
to exist between workers’ legal 
rights and the enforcement of 
these rights. 
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laws, finally reached economic compensation 
agreements with their managers.   
Other workers have not been so lucky. 
On December 13, 2007, at 7:30 a.m. outside 
the 10,000-person Nine Dragons (Dongguan) 
plant, around 2,000 workers, security guards, 
and cleaners from the raw materials department 
took to the streets to protest against exces-
sive wage deductions and illegitimate contract 
termination. Overnight, the regular workers 
were forced to become the contingent workers 
of two employment agencies. According to 
the LCL’s Article 66, contingent labor should 
generally only be resorted to for short-term, 
supplementary, and substitute positions. In 
this Nine Dragons department, the process-
ing of waste papers and raw materials is the 
crux of the production and the entire work 
flow. The factory management’s one-sided, 
abusive use of outsourcing was a blow to the 
workers’ rights and interests. Yet riot police 
were dispatched to disperse the crowd. Most 
of the workers either quit upon receiving little 
severance pay or signed contracts with the 
employment agencies.26 Six months after the 
strike, on June 16, 2008, Nine Dragons dismissed 
the remaining 415 contingent workers, deem-
ing them redundant. “The paper-processing 
years were the hardest hit by this new policy, 
as the company refused to grant open-term 
contracts to them (per LCL Article 14, Section 
1). Several workers immediately approached the 
workplace-based union for help. Unsurprisingly, 
given the fact that both the union chairperson 
and vice chairperson were top-level managers, 
the workers’ efforts were futile. In an open 
letter25 undersigned by hundreds of his co-
workers, a 38-year-old male warehouse depart-
ment worker who had been at the company since 
December 1994, explained:
We all thought that the Labor 
Contract Law going into effect on 
January 1 would have showered 
us—the weak and disadvantaged 
masses—with blessings. Our youth 
is gone with the days of the growth 
of the company. To our profound 
disappointment, none of us were 
offered open-term contracts 
despite years of diligent work. In 
our thirties to forties, we are under 
heavy familial burden. We are 
afraid of losing our jobs. We feel 
this is extremely unfair and we are 
angry, too. 
In May 2008, once the Law on the 
Mediation and Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes was enforced, the core group of 64 
workers filed their collective dispute with the 
local arbitration committee (the Mediation and 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes Law Article 
53 stipulates that arbitration fees, amounting to 
several hundred yuan, are waived). In response 
to public pressure to look for “Mickey Mouse’s 
conscience” and increased worker actions, 
Disney—one of the biggest customers of Hung 
Hing—stepped in to clear up the “misun-
derstandings between factory, management, 
and workers.” The most adversely affected 
workers, buoyed by both the levers of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and the new labor 
At a toy factory, the 
company’s 100 
workers were asked to 
sign contracts that 
were written in 
English, a language 
they could not read. 
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that there were “flaws in the factory management 
system . . . but [that] great improvements have 
been achieved.”31 The local state’s defense of 
Nine Dragons has attracted tremendous media 
attention, and even public outcry. From the cor-
porate side, Nike, one of Nine Dragons’s clients, 
welcomed the Chinese union’s “independent 
verification.” A Nike reply to SACOM’s letter 
dated June 11, 2008, reads: 
Nike believes that the process 
undertaken by the [All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions] 
ACFTU is critically important, 
and we will wait for their follow-
up report before advising our 
manufacturers on the compliance 
status of Nine Dragons.32  
Evaluating this campaign in a positive 
light, it was unprecedented for a municipal 
trade union to meet with Hong Kong university 
students to contest the meaning of “Chinese 
sweatshops.” Such state-society dialogue augurs 
well for progressive social change, particularly 
since the central government did not suppress 
SACOM’s cross-border advocacy 
for workers’ legal rights.  
In sum, these reported cases 
of workers’ rights violations are 
only the tip of a huge iceberg. The 
effectiveness of the new law on 
labor contracts, as demonstrated 
by surveys and case studies 
administered by NGOs, is very 
limited. The Chinese authorities’ 
September 2008 efforts to issue 
implementing guidelines for the 
LCL, providing legal criteria and standardized 
procedures for handling labor disputes between 
the courts and labor arbitration agencies, are 
not likely to meaningfully improve conditions. 
The current global financial crisis has exacer-
bated hostility to labor protections in China. 
Factory owners and foreign investors have 
automation process had been completed,” 
explained management.27     
SACOM condemned Nine Dragons as a 
“sweatshop” in its report entitled Paper Money: 
The Exploitation of Chinese Workers of Nine 
Dragons Paper Owned by the ‘Richest Woman’ 
Zhang Yin.28 Zhang Yin, the CEO of the big-
gest papermaker in mainland China and an 
elected member of the National Committee 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), submitted a proposal 
to the Beijing government about canceling 
open-term labor contracts—warning of the 
country’s dangerous return to the old Maoist, 
socialist system of “iron rice bowl” (permanent 
employment)—only two months after the law’s 
enactment.29 She also explicitly maintained 
that “from the perspective of development, a 
country will not become strong and affluent if 
the disparity between the rich and the poor does 
not exist;” in her view, “if the law overprotects 
labor, an enterprise can hardly operate.”30 Was 
she not representing the shared interests of 
mainland China’s new capitalist class and the 
international business lobbyists? 
On May 12, 2008, one month after the 
publication of SACOM’s report, the provincial 
trade union intervened and demanded a face-to-
face meeting with the group. The Guangdong 
union, after joining forces with the Dongguan 
city- and township-level governments, con-
cluded that “Nine Dragons is absolutely not a 
sweatshop.” The union’s vice president noted 
The global financial crisis has 
exacerbated the hostility of 
Chinese factory owners and 
foreign investors toward the 
new labor law. 
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Meanwhile, civil society organizations are 
increasingly using the law to fight for Chinese 
workers’ rights. At the community level, front-
line NGO labor organizers distribute leaflets that 
simplify the terms of labor laws and regulations, 
offer workers free legal consultation hotlines 
and labor law training classes, and represent 
workers in lawsuits. In the workplace, labor 
rights trainers encourage sustainable dialogue 
between managers and workers by establishing 
democratic representative mechanisms. Elected 
worker representatives should be able to exercise 
their legal right to discuss with management 
work rules that directly bear on the workers’ 
interests (per LCL, Article 4). Including workers 
in the day-to-day monitoring process is the key 
to promoting workplace democracy in China’s 
globalized political economy.  
already protested that new labor laws intended 
to provide Chinese workers with a minimum 
of protection raise “production costs.” They are 
pressuring local governments and economic 
sectors to shelter their businesses from the 
inconvenience of law enforcement, further 
jeopardizing the legal protection of workers’ 
rights in China.
Chinese workers have been keen to use the 
new labor law as their weapon. In the first six 
months of 2008, Guangdong courts handled 
about 40,000 labor disputes—a 157.7 percent 
increase from last year, in which the Pearl River 
Delta area accounted for 96.5 percent of all 
cases.33 According to the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security statistics, in the 
same period, arbitrated labor disputes soared 
by 300 percent in Guangdong, 145 percent in 
Chongqing, and 92.5 percent in Shanghai.34   
*The author would like to thank Professors Nelson Lichtenstein, Cindy Yin-wah Chu, Pun Ngai, 
Dr. Dimitri Kessler, Dorothy Young, Paul Garver, and the activists from Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM).
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